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of property lies in the fact that the donor's heirs can revoke the
donation for non-performance of the charge and thus defeat
the rights of the beneficiary altogether.11'" This danger can be
avoided. The donor can deprive his representatives of the power
to revoke the legacy, leaving them only the power to require
specific performance.11
CONCLUSION
French lawyers and their clients can create, and in many
instances have created, property interests which in complex-
ity rival those established in common law jurisdictions. Such
devices as the "permitted" substitutions, the donation avec
charge, the stipulation pour autrui, the alternative conditional
legacy, the usufruct, the fiducia and the fondation lend them-
selves to almost infinite complication, and evidence that not only
the common law property system, but the civilian system as well,
is sadly in need of drastic reform.' Complex "future interests"
and their civilian equivalents, which today prop up the privi-
leged few just as the substitution fidgicommissaire once did the
feudal aristocracy of France, might well be relegated to history
and remembered only for their resistance to necessary reform.
F. HODGE O'NEAL *
THE LOUISIANA FAIR TRADE ACT AND INTERSTATE
TRANSACTIONS
The Krauss Company Case
Plaintiff, a manufacturer, instituted an action in the federal
district court seeking to enjoin defendant, a retailer, from selling
the plaintiff's trade-marked goods at less than the minimum
price fixed by fair trade agreements which plaintiff had made
with more than a hundred retail dealers in Louisiana under Act
13 of 1936,1 popularly known as the Louisiana Fair Trade Act.
114. A contract containing a stipulation pour autrwi can be used to ac-
complish many of the results obtained by the donation avec charge; but the
stipulation pour autrut can be used only inter vivos.
115. Le Paulle, op. cit. supra note 6, at 1137.
116. Louisiana's property system is far simpler than either those of
common law origin or that of France. Even in Louisiana, however, there is
need for considerable reform.
* Member of the Louisiana Bar.
1. Dart's Stats. (1939) H 9809.1-9809.6.
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Although the defendant was not a party to any of the above con-
tracts, he was nevertheless subject to suit for having "wilfully
and knowingly" sold the article for less than the price stipulated.
2
Held, relief denied. The Fair Trade Act, as interpreted in the
instant case, authorizes only contracts which provide that the
product shall not be resold "except at the price stipulated by the
vendor,"8 and the contracts in question exceeded this authority
by providing that the goods should not be resold at a price less
than the minimum price prescribed by the plaintiff. Since the
contracts exceeded the protection of the Fair Trade Act, they are
invalid under the state statutory provisions forbidding contracts
in restraint of trade.4 Mennen Company v. Krauss Company,
Limited, 37 F. Supp. 161 (S.D. La. 1941).
The effect of Judge Borah's decision in the instant case is to
sound the death knell of resale price maintenance contracts in
Louisiana for many practical purposes. Most of the commodities
affected by these agreements have moved in interstate commerce;
hence the agreements must conform to the terms of the Miller-
Tydings amendment in order to avoid being regarded as illegal
under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.5 This amendment excepts
from the ban of the Sherman Act agreements prescribing mini-
mum prices for the resale of a commodity., Manufacturers selling
into Louisiana have sought to safeguard themselves from federal
attack by employing in their contracts terms which conform
meticulously to the language of the amendment. They now find
themselves in the unhappy predicament of being unable to steer
a safe course between Scylla and Charybdis: If their contracts
conform to the federal requirements they will overstep the pro-
tection afforded by the state Fair Trade Act as interpreted by
Judge Borah, and hence will run afoul of the Louisiana prohibi-
tions against contracts in restraint of trade. On the other hand
2. La. Act 13 of 1936, § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 9809.2].
3. Id. at § 1(1) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 9809.1(1)].
4. La. Const. of 1921, Art XIX, § 14; La. Act 90 of 1892 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) §§ 4924-4931]; La. Act 11 of 1915 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4905-4923].
5. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as interpreted in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 31 S.Ct. 376, 55 L.Ed. 502 (1911). Dunn, Re-
sale Price Maintenance (1923) 32 Yale L. J. 676.
6. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended by 50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1
(Supp. 1940): "Every contract, combination In the form of trust or other-
wise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
states, or witb foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal: Provided,
That nothing herein contained shall render illegal contracts or agreements




if they draft their agreements in conformity with the state Fair
Trade Act and stipulate the exact price at which the commodity
shall be resold, they will lose the protection of the Miller-Tydings
Amendment and be subject to prosecution under the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case
of Dr. Miles Medical Company v. John D. Park & Sons Company.7
The rationale advanced in the instant case is that the Fair
Trade Act is in derogation of common right8 and must be strictly
construed. Since this act permits only contracts which provide
that the buyer will not resell the commodity "except at the price
stipulated by the vendor," no authority is granted to enter into
agreements whereby the resale may be made at any price desired
by the retailer so long as a minimum price or "floor" is main-
tained. The court felt that in some way the principles of fair
competition as expressed in the Louisiana statutes would
be outraged unless every retailer were compelled to sell the com-
modity at exactly the same price., In answer to the above, it
may be said that a contract which allows the free interplay of
competition above a prescribed minimum price should be less
onerous to free competition than a stipulation by which the manu-
facturer is enabled to saddle the market with a single retail price
of his own choosing. An instructive analogy is found in those
cases which have upheld the power of the state to prohibit the
sale of a commodity at a price below cost.9 The ground most
frequently advanced in defense of such statutes is that they do
not effect a regimentation of prices, but merely fix a level above
which competition is permitted to function freely.10 This latter is
generally regarded as a less drastic restraint upon free competi-
a7. 220 U.S. 373, 31 S.Ct. 376, 55 L.Ed. 502 (1911).
8. Cf. Hamiltori, Common Right, Due Process and Antitrust (1940) 7 Law
and Contemp. Prob. 24.
9. See, for example, Louisiana Unfair Sales Act, La. Act 338 of 1940
[Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1940) § 4931.1-4931.8]. These statutes are sometimes
known as Unfair Practice Acts [I.e., California, Cal. Gen. Laws (Deering,
1937) Act 87811.
10. "The present statute ... in its true sense ... is not a price fixing
statute at all. It merely fixes a level below which the producer or distribu-
tor may not sell with intent to injure a competitor. In all other respects price
is the result of untrammelled discretion." Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau
of Southern California v. National Candy & Tobacco Co., 11 Cal. (2d) 634,
655, 82 P.(2d) 3, 15 (1938).
"[The Montana Unfair Practice Act] fixes a minimum price only, leav-
ing in the seller the discretion to sell at ivhatever price above that he
chooses. The minimum price is fixed not as an end in Itself, but to prevent
ruinous price-cutting injuring or destroying competitors." Associated Mer-
chants of Montana v. Ormesher, 107 Mont. 530, 543, 86 P.(2d) 1031, 1033 (1939).
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tion than rigid price fixing. The same idea is applicable in resale
price maintenance by a manufacturer or distributor..1
Furthermore, it is hardly realistic to assume that the Louisi-
ana legislature intended to permit price-fixing only upon the con-
dition that every retailer be compelled to sell at exactly the same
price. This assumption ignores the circumstances attendant upon
the nation-wide enactment of Fair Trade Laws. For a number of
years such acts had been urged upon the legislatures of the
various states, but without success, because of a fear that statutes
authorizing the fixing of prices through contract would be held
unconstitutional under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 12 When the pioneer Illinois act"3 was upheld by the
United States Supreme Court in the case of Old Dearborn Dis-
tributing Company v. Seagram-Distillers Corporation" in 1936,.
that act was immediately copied slavishly by a dozen or more
states and enacted into law. Louisiana was one of those states.
It is reasonable to believe that the idea uppermost in the minds
of the legislators was the enactment of a statute which would
meet the pressing demand for resale price maintenance, and
whose constitutionality was assured. The Illinois act, which was
effective, and which also had run the gauntlet of the Supreme
Court, appeared to meet both specifications. It validated con-
tracts which provided "that the buyer will not resell such a
commodity except at the price stipulated by the vendor." This
same provision appeared verbatim in the Fair Trade Acts of
11. "Such statutes [Fair Trade Acts] permit the owner of trade-marked
articles to fix the resale price of such articles. The basic purpose of such a
statute and the one here involved [the California Unfair Practice Act] is
the same. Both are aimed primarily at cut price retailing and the ruinous
use of loss leaders. The Fair Trade Act alms to correct the evil from above
by legalizing resale price maintenance, by penalizing all who sell trade-
marked articles in disregard of the owner's contract even though not parties
to It. The present statute operates from below and is broader in scope."
Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau of Southern California v. National Candy
& Tobacco Co., 11 Cal. (2d) 634, 655, 82 P.(2d) 3, 15 (1938).
12. It was generally believed that the right of the owner of property to
fix the price at which he will sell it was an inherent attribute of the property
itself, and as such was within the protection of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amepdments. Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262
U.S. 522, 43 S.Ct. 630, 67 L.Ed. 1103, 27 A.L.R. 1280 (1923); Tyson and Brother
-United Theatre Ticket Offices v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 47 S.Ct. 426, 71 L.Ed.
718, 58 A.L.R. 1236 (1927); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 48 S.Ct. 545, 72
L.Ed. 913, 56 A.L.R. 1327 (1928); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 49
S.Ct. 115, 73 L.Ed. 287, 60 A.L.R. 596 (1929); New State Ice Co. v. Llebmann,
285 U.S. 262, 52 S.Ct. 371, 76 L.Ed. 747 (1932). See Old Dearborn Distributidg
Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 192-193, 57 S.Ct. 139, 143-144, 81
L.Ed. 109, 118 (1936).
13. fll. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 121 1/2, § 188.
14. 299 U.S. 183, 57 S.Ct. 189, 81 L.Ed. 130 (1936).
1941]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. III
fifteen states."5 Until the present decision no one had contended
that this type of provision precluded the making of agreements
which fixed merely a minimum resale price." It is interesting to
note, however, that seven states1" which have adopted the Illinois
act have pretermitted the problem by substituting the phrase
"at less than the minimum price stipulated by the vendor" in
place of the phrase "except at the price stipulated." Furthermore,
in the more recent model law recommended by the National
Association of Retail Druggists, which has been adopted in nine-
teen states,1 8 this altered phraseology is incorporated. 9
o
Within the Louisiana act itself there is substantial evidence
that the legislature was not of the opinion that price-fixing would
be permissible only "if every retailer should be compelled to sell
15. Arizona, Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) § 74-201-74-206; California, Cal. Gen.
Laws (Deering, 1937) Act 8782; Illinois, Ill. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd,
1935) c. 121 %; Iowa, Iowa Code (1935) § § 9884-gl-9884-g7; Kentucky, Laws
1936-37, c. 24; Louisiana, La. Act 13 of 1936 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 9809];
Massachusetts, Mass. Ann. Laws (Supp. 1938) c. 93, § 14a et seq.; Michigan,
Mich. Stat. Ann. (Henderson, Supp. 1938) § 19,321 et seq.; Mississippi, Miss.
Gen. Laws (1938) c. 348; New Mexico, N. M. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, Supp.
1938) § 145-107 et seq.; New York, Unconsol. Laws (Thompson's 1939) § 2201
et seq.; North Dakota, N. D. Laws (1937) c. 126; Tennessee, Tenn. Code Ann.
(Michle, 1938) § 6770-1 et seq.; Washington, Wash. Code Ann. (Pierce, Supp.
1937) § 7109-51 et seq.; Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. (1937) § 133.25 et seq.
16. It is clear that the Miller-Tydings Amendment was drafted with the
Illinois type statute in mind. It was the prototype of the Fair Trade Acts
in effect in 1937, and the purpose of the Amendment was to implement the
provisions of these acts by removing the barrier to their applicatiq to
Interstate transactions. 81 Cong. Rec. 9699-9700 (1937).
17. Colorado, Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie; Supp. 1938) c. 165; Maine, Me.
Laws (1937) c. 204; Michigan, Mich. Stat. Ann. (Henderson, Supp. 1938) 1
19,321 et seq.; New Hampshire, N. H. Pub. Laws (1937) c. 184; Ohio, Ohio
Code Ann. (Baldwin, 1936) § 6402-2 et seq.; Oklahoma, Okla. Stat. Ann.
(1938) tit. 78, § 41 et seq.; South Carolina, S. C. Laws (1937) no. 206.
18. Alabama, Ala. Laws (1939) H.B. 102; Arkansas, Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope,
1937) § 5606 et seq.; Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1937) c. 138a;
lrida, Fla. Laws (1937) c. 18-395; Georgia, Ga. Laws (1937) 800; Idaho,
Idaho Laws (1937) c. 240; Indiana, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1940) c.
66, § 301 et seq.; Kansas, Kan. Laws (1937) c. 165; Maryland, Md. Ann. Code
(Flack, 1939) Art. 83, §§ 103-110; Minnesota, Minn. Stat. Ann. (Mason, Supp.
1938) § 3976.51 et seq.; Montana, Mont. Laws (1937) c. 42; Nebraska, Neb.
Comp. Stat. (Kyle, Supp. 1937) § 59-1101 et seq.; North Carolina, N. C. Laws
(1937) c. 350; Oregon, Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) § 43-401 et seq.; South
Dakota, S. D. Code Ann. (1939) c. 54:0401 et seq.; Utah, Utah Rev. Stat.
(Supp. 1939) tit. 95, c. 3, §§1-10; Virginia, Va. Code Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1938)
§ 1463(j); West Virginia, W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie & Sublett, 1937) §
4678(1) et seq.; Wyoming, Wyo. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1940) c. 117, art. 6, §1
601-612.
19. The language of the Model Act is as follows:
"Sec. 2. No contract ... shall be construed to violate any provision of
the general statutes by reason of any of the following provisions which may
be contained in such contract:"
"B. That the buyer will require from any dealer to whom he may resell
such commodity an agreement that he will not, in turn, resell at less than
the minimum price stipulated by the seller."
COMMENTS
the commodity at exactly the same price." Section 2 of the act,
under which this suit was brought, provides that "wilfully and
knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling any commodity
at less than the price stipulated in any contract ... is unfair com-
petition and is actionpble .... -20 No mention is made here or
elsewhere in the act of sanctions imposed for reselling the com-
modity at more than the price stipulated. The conclusion appears
inescapable that the legislature had in mind only minimum
prices. It is most unlikely that the lawmakers would authorize a
price-fixing agreement without providing protection for that
agreement in all areas of its operation.
The soundness of resale price maintenance from an economic
viewpoint is by no means established. However, if 'an abandon-
ment of the practice is desirable, such a movement should ema-
nate from the legislature. The decision in the instant case, because
of its drastic effect upon resale price maintenance in interstate
transactions, deserves a careful reconsideration. An interpreta-
tion of the Louisiana act more consonant with the legislative his-
tory of fair trade statutes and more in keeping with the interstate
aspects of resale price maintenance is greatly to be desired.
M. G. DUm*
WEX S. MALONEt
THE LOUISIANA BLUE SKY LAW
"It is better to close the barn door before the horse is stolen."
This homely proverb epitomizes the purpose of regulatory Blue
Sky Laws which have been enacted in almost every state. Such
statutes purport to prevent promotional frauds by providing for
a close scrutiny of new stock or bond issues prior to their being
offered to the public. Then too, the Federal Securities Act'
regulates securities which are offered or delivered through the
mails or interstate communications. These statutes afford the
buying public much needed protection, and when properly ad-
ministered do not impose an undue burden on the sale of
securities.
20. La. Act 13 of 1936, § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 9809. 2].
* Assistant Professor of Business Administration, Louisiana State Uni-
versity.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77 (Sdpp. 1940).
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